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ABSTRACT
Public-private partnership (PPP) projects are often characterised 
by increased complexity and uncertainty due to their idiosyncrasy 
in the management and delivery processes such as long-term 
lifecycle, incomplete contracting, and the multitude of stakeholders. 
An appropriate risk allocation is particularly crucial to achieving 
project success. This paper focuses on the risk allocation in PPP 
projects and argues that the transaction cost economics (TCE) 
theory can integrate the economics part, which is currently missing, 
into the risk management research. A TCE-based approach is 
proposed as a logical framework for allocating risks between public 
and private sectors in PPP projects. A case study of the Southern 
Cross Station redevelopment project in Australia is presented to 
illustrate the approach. The allocation of important risks is put 
under scrutiny. Lessons learnt are discussed and alternative 
management approaches drawing on TCE theory are proposed.
Keywords:  procurement, risk allocation, transaction cost, public-
private partnership, Melbourne.
INTRODUCTION
A massive demand for investment in infrastructure has been 
caused by rapid urbanisation in many countries (The World Bank, 
2006). In order to tackle the problems within the conventional 
provision of infrastructure funded by governments, such as 
governmental ineffi cacies and shortage of governmental funds, a 
range of public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements are rapidly 
becoming the preferred way to provide public services in many 
countries, including Australia (Doloi and Jin, 2007).
DTF (2000) describe the core principle for PPPs is value for money 
(VFM). Risk transfer means appropriate risks can be transferred to 
the private sector, which is supposed to be capable of managing 
those risks better, and is a major VFM driver (Hayford, 2006). 
Accordingly, cheaper and higher-quality infrastructure services 
may be provided than is possible using conventional methods. 
However, the complexity of the arrangements and incomplete 
contracting nature have led to increased risk exposure for all the 
parties involved (Woodward, 1995). Effective risk allocation in 
PPP projects is therefore no easy job. Why should a given risk be 
transferred to private partners in one project while being retained 
by government or shared with another? What is the rationale for 
achieving an optimal distribution of risks? The answers to these 
questions are critically important to the success (or failure) of PPP 
projects (DFA, 2005a). 
In this paper, the theory of transaction cost economics (TCE) is 
proposed to help to address these questions. The TCE approach is 
adopted in the analysis of the case study of a large scale transport 
infrastructure PPP project in Melbourne, Australia. In the following 
sections, risk allocation practice in PPP projects and TCE are 
briefl y reviewed, followed by a short presentation of the research 
methodology. Then the PPP project in question is introduced. The 
allocation of two typical risks, i.e. fi nancial risk and construction 
risk, are discussed in detail and TCE-oriented alternatives 
are provided. Finally, a brief conclusion and future research 
recommendations are given in the last section.
RISK ALLOCATION IN PPP PROJECTS
In traditional public projects, the public sector purchases an asset 
from private sector contractors and consultants whose liability is 
limited to the design and construction of the asset. Finance and 
operational risks remain with the public sector. Risk allocation 
in PPP projects is fundamentally different. The PPP model 
involves the purchase of a relatively risk-free long-term service. 
The government usually bears little or no asset-based risk and is 
entitled to reducing payments, abatements and compensation if 
the service is not delivered to the specifi ed standards.
Since risk transfer is one of the major drivers for VFM, the 
government has to decide how the identifi ed risks are best 
distributed between the partners in a PPP project. In theory, all 
project risks should be borne by the private sector in that service 
recipients only pay for satisfactory services (Ng and Loosemore, 
2007). However, in reality, the government has to determine what 
risks it should take back to achieve an optimal risk distribution 
and thereby achieve VFM. It is critical for government to 
understand that while it is sub-optimal for the public sector to retain 
inappropriate risks, it is also sub-optimal to transfer inappropriate 
risk to the private sector (Arndt, 1999). This is because transfer 
of risks to the private sector comes at a price, though it is one of 
the key VFM drivers in a PPP transaction (Hayford, 2006). If risks 
rest inappropriately with the public sector, government will raise 
taxes or reduce services to pay for its obligations when the risks 
materialise. In contrast, if risks rest inappropriately with the private 
sector, excess premiums will be charged to the government or 
even directly to the end users.
Inappropriate risk allocation thus can damage the VFM proposition 
of a PPP deal. The Public Sector Comparator (PSC) and the 
Private Financing Predictor (PFP) are approximate measures of 
the whole-of-life project cost. As models that are dependent upon 
a range of long-term value forecasts and risk impacts, they are 
both highly sensitive to the allocation of risks. The risk allocation 
strategy is integral to determining the VFM potential of a PPP 
project as distinct from other delivery options (DFA, 2005c). 
Moreover, the accuracy of the presumed transfer of a package 
of risks to the private sector, together with the identifi cation 
and valuation of project risks, are essential to the construction 
of a meaningful PPP project (DFA, 2005a). Risk allocation in 
PPP projects can also be seen as a way to establish fi nancial 
equilibrium between partners (Medda, 2007). Inadequate risk 
allocation can thus raise the costs of capital and tariff levels in 
the investment. This often necessitates a renegotiation of the 
concession and a new risk allocation scheme. Such renegotiation 
can be a lengthy and costly process and often brings about 
opportunistic behaviour that increases transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1996). 
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Unfortunately, risk transfer is often handled poorly in many PPP 
projects (Ng and Loosemore, 2007). A common perception that 
privatisation involves transfer of all risks to the private sector 
was prevalent in many countries until recently. Although this has 
been found to have major limitations and many governments now 
recognise that privatisation is a partnership in which they must 
retain some risk, whether in the form of fi nancial subsidies or the 
assumption of contractual responsibilities or contingent liabilities, 
the principle of optimal risk allocation is often not followed in many 
PPP infrastructure projects (Faulkner, 2004; Thomas et al., 2003). 
Sometimes risks will inevitably be allocated to the party least able 
to refuse them rather than the party best able to manage them, 
especially when the government maintains maximum competitive 
tension.
Risk management practices in PPP projects have been found to be 
highly variable, intuitive, subjective and unsophisticated (Ng and 
Loosemore, 2007). Given the critical importance of risk allocation 
in PPP projects, intensive research has been conducted in this 
research area (e.g., see Walker and Chau,1999; Faulkner, 2004; 
Medda, 2007; Ng and Loosemore, 2007; Thomas et al., 2003). 
Most research focuses on how to achieve optimal (effective or 
equitable) risk allocation, which seeks to minimise both project 
costs and the risks to the project by allocating particular risks to the 
party in the best position to control them (DFA, 2005b; DTF, 2000; 
Hayford, 2006; Kangari, 1995). This is based on the principle that 
the party in the greatest position of control or possessing the best 
capability of management with respect to a particular risk has the 
best opportunity to reduce the likelihood of the risk eventuation and 
to control the consequences of the risk if it materialises, and thus 
should assume it (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2002; Thomas 
et al., 2003). Allocating the risk in line with those opportunities 
creates an incentive for the controlling party to use its infl uence to 
prevent or mitigate the risk and to use its capacity to do so in the 
overall interests of the project (Ahmed et al., 1999).
Nonetheless, research in risk management is concerned mainly 
with process and technique, neither of which is successful in 
understanding which kind of existing governance structures best 
suits a particular risk in terms of effi ciency and why (Walker and 
Chau, 1999). Although researchers try to understand the forces 
that determine the most appropriate or optimal risk allocation for 
a specifi c project, the part related to economics has not been 
incorporated yet. It is submitted in this paper that Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) can contribute to this and can facilitate a more 
logical and holistic understanding of the allocation of risks in PPP 
projects.
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
The TCE approach developed out of the institutional economics 
of Commons and the analysis of administrative behaviour by the 
Carnegie school (Winch, 1989). This approach emerges from 
the economist Coase’s seminal work, in which he advances his 
theory of the existence of fi rms and argued that, in the absence 
of transaction costs, there is no economic basis for the existence 
of the fi rm (Coase, 1937). TCE recognises that there are costs of 
using the pricing system and that such costs give rise to various 
forms of economic organisations (Coase, 1988). It represents a 
major attempt to combine economic and sociological perspectives 
on industrial organisation (Winch, 1989).  This analysis supersedes 
neoclassical economic analysis, which assumes that economic 
activities can be coordinated costlessly by a system of prices. 
Neoclassical theory is ‘simply a rhetorical device adopted to 
facilitate discussion of the price system’ (Demsetz, 1991) and tells 
nothing about the organisational structure (Hart, 1990). 
Transaction costs are the costs of running the economic system 
(Arrow, 1969). Such costs are the economic equivalent of friction 
in physical systems and one distinguished from production 
costs (Williamson, 1985). TCE poses the problem of economic 
organisation as a problem of contracting and assumes that (1) 
human agents are subject to bounded rationality, where behaviour 
is ‘intendedly rational but only limitedly so’ (Simon, 1961), and 
(2) is given to opportunism, which is a condition of ‘self-interest 
seeking with guile’ (Williamson, 1985).
TCE further maintains that there are rational economic 
reasons for organising some transactions one way and other 
transactions another. The principal dimensions with respect to 
which transactions differ are (1) asset specifi city, the degree to 
which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by 
alternative users without sacrifi cing productive value (Williamson, 
1996), (2) uncertainty, which may arise from ‘state of nature’ or 
changes in the external environment affecting a system (Rao, 
2003) or when incomplete contracting and asset specifi city are 
joined (Williamson, 1996), and (3) frequency, which admits the 
fact that the pair-wise identity of the parties matters and has 
pervasive consequences for the organisation of economic activity 
(Williamson, 1996). The consequent organisational imperative is to 
‘organise transactions so as to economise on bounded rationality 
while simultaneously safeguarding them against the hazards of 
opportunism’ (Williamson, 1985). By assigning transactions to 
governance structures in a discriminating way, transaction costs 
are economised (Williamson, 1985).
The essential insight of TCE is that in order to economise on 
the total cost of a good or service, both production costs and 
transaction costs must be taken into account (Williamson, 
1985, 1996; Winch, 2006). A production technique that has the 
lowest production costs might not be the economising choice if 
transaction costs are also taken into account (Winch, 2001). While 
a traditional economic analysis can identify the most effi cient 
choice of production technique, it cannot explain the most effective 
use of that production technique (Winch, 2006). It is noteworthy 
that transaction costs are always assessed in a comparative 
institutional way (Williamson, 1996). Empirical research on 
transaction cost issues remains whether organisational relations 
align with the attributes of transactions as predicted by transaction 
cost reasoning or not (Williamson, 1985).
Risk allocation in PPP projects is suitable to be viewed from 
a TCE perspective because any issue that can be formulated 
as a contracting problem can be investigated to advantage in 
transaction cost economising terms (Williamson, 1985). The 
suitability also arises from many features of PPPs, which include 
incomplete contracting, long-term partnership, heavy investment 
into assets, complex uncertainty, etc. (Jin and Doloi, 2008). In 
this paper, it is submitted that, concisely, choosing a strategy for 
allocating a given risk could actually be viewed as the process 
of deciding the proportion of risk management responsibility 
between internal and external organisations based on a series of 
characteristics of the risk management service (RMS) transaction 
in question. 
The physical and human asset specifi cities are the major 
characteristics of an RMS transaction in a PPP project because 
they bear the most relevant and infl uential ramifi cation. Whilst 
the problems of physical asset specifi city arise post-contract 
through ‘fundamental transformation’ (Williamson, 1985) and 
especially relate to particular types of civil engineering projects 
(Winch, 1989), human asset specifi city is more widely relevant to 
construction projects because detailed knowledge is held in a fi rm, 
usually by a relatively small number of people (Reve and Levitt, 
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1984; Walker and Chau, 1999). The most important specifi ed 
human assets in RMS transaction would be the organisational 
capability of managing a given risk (Jin and Doloi, 2008).
Transaction frequency is another major characteristic of an RMS 
transaction. Although it is low in construction, often effectively unity 
for most client-supplier dyads (Winch, 2002), this is one of the 
areas in which many clients are making changes with the aim of 
achieving learning benefi ts.  Transaction frequency is expected to 
infl uence the governance over RMS transaction because PPP per 
se indicates a higher level of transaction frequency due to its long-
term commitment (Williamson, 1996).
Uncertainty is the third major characteristic. In fact, it is the level 
of uncertainty that the parties involved in the construction industry 
face that most clearly distinguishes the construction industry from 
others (Stinchcombe, 1959). The project process is basically 
a process of the progressive reduction of uncertainty through 
time (Winch et al., 1998). However, PPP projects usually bear 
the feature of much prolonged uncertainty due to their decades 
of lifecycle and the diffi culty in foreseeing future uncertainties, 
especially those inherent in later stages.
The appropriate choice of RMS transaction governance mode is a 
function of the aforementioned characteristics (Williamson, 1975). 
These characteristics become troublesome in interaction with each 
other (Winch, 2001). Without asset specifi city, any negotiations to 
handle unforeseen events can be made when they occur. Without 
uncertainty, complete contracts can be written in advance to 
foreclose opportunistic behaviour that arises from asset specifi city. 
Without frequency, it would be diffi cult to determine whether or not 
there is any return on investing in transaction-specifi c governance 
modes.
A public partner could manage a risk entirely in-house (hierarchy). 
Transaction costs may include the cost of setting up a team and 
monitoring its performance, among others. This is the case when 
asset specifi city is relatively high and combined with high levels 
of uncertainty (Williamson, 1996). Arguably, transaction and 
production costs are lower than the costs for the same level of 
RMS procured through the market. Otherwise, a public partner 
may purchase the required RMS entirely from the market or 
carry out the task together with a supplier. Transaction costs may 
include the cost of devising the service contract and monitoring 
the service provider, among others. This is the case when asset 
specifi city is relatively low and consequently market power 
prevails  (Williamson, 1996). The current industrial practices are 
investigated against these TCE principles in the case study.
RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY
Based on the literature review, the main research questions 
identifi ed in this study are whether the current risk allocation 
practices in PPP projects are TCE-oriented and whether they are 
appropriate and effi cient. Accordingly, the research objectives are 
to demonstrate how major risks inherent in PPP projects were 
distributed, to investigate the management performance of those 
risks in the adopted risk allocation patterns, and to propose more 
effective strategies for allocating those risks following the TCE 
approach.
The research fi eldwork was carried out in two consecutive 
phases, which include an industry-wide questionnaire survey for 
a quantitative analysis and a case study for a qualitative analysis. 
This paper reports the fi ndings of the case study. The Southern 
Cross Station Redevelopment project (SCSR or the Project), 
formerly known as Spencer Street Station Redevelopment project 
in Melbourne, one of the fi rst projects of its kind in Australia 
procured using the PPP method, is selected in this research. Data 
about the Project are collected from a range of sources, including 
a semi-structured interview with the project director, contract 
documentation, government and private sector reports, newspaper 
articles, and journal articles. 
The following sections present the information gathered from 
above sources and provide detailed discussion and suggestion on 
the risk allocation issues involved in this social-economical-hybrid 
transport infrastructure PPP project. 
CASE STUDY
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The SCSR project, worth AU$700 million, is currently one of the 
largest social and economical infrastructure projects procured 
using the PPP approach in the State of Victoria, Australia. 
The project adopts Partnerships Victoria policy, which was 
formulated in 2000 (DTF, 2000). It is expected that the exposure of 
governments adopting PPP models to risks such as cost and time 
overruns is minimised. 
The Southern Cross Station (SCS or the Station) is Victoria’s 
gateway for interstate rail and coach travellers and also 
Melbourne’s gateway for regional rail and coach travellers and 
a second major hub for suburban train travel to and from the 
CBD. Special domestic and international events such as the 
Australian Tennis Open and the Melbourne Cup (a horserace) are 
also serviced by the Station. The Station is unique in its scope 
of intermodal passenger transport services facilitating travel by 
suburban trains, regional trains, interstate trains, special events 
trains, coach and bus services, and trams and taxis. The facility 
was also designed to provide for a proposed Melbourne Airport 
Transit Link (MATL) and a possible interstate Very High Speed 
Train (VHST). It was estimated that the capacity requirement of the 
facility in 2050 will be a peak passenger fl ow of 30,000 people/hour 
(DoI, 2002). 
The Project comprises four elements, namely the transport 
interchange facility, rail modifi cations, signaling upgrade, and 
commercial development. As one of Melbourne’s principal arrival 
and interchange hubs for passengers, the Station has both 
economic and social signifi cance. The Project was expected to 
offer a unique opportunity to respond to the strategic status of the 
transport interchange with world class architecture of enduring 
quality and to act as a catalyst to encourage signifi cant growth and 
bring new transport users to the area (DoI, 2002).
The state government of Victoria (the Government) fi rst publicly 
announced the redevelopment plan in February 2000 in order to 
link Melbourne to its regional hinterland, which was an integral 
part of the Government’s AU$1.5 billion Linking Victoria policy 
aiming to invest in transport infrastructure, such as railways, 
roads, and ports. The Project was planned to be completed 
before the 26th Commonwealth Games that were held in 
Melbourne in April 2006. In July 2001, the Government called 
for expressions of interest (EOIs) for the Project in pursuance of 
Partnerships Victoria policy (Lindsay, 2003) and announced three 
shortlisted consortia on October 11, 2001, which were (1) ABN 
AMRO (developer), Leighton Contractors (design, construction 
and refurbishment contractor), and Daryl Jackson Architects 
associated with Grimshaw Architects (architects); (2) Australand, 
the Commonwealth Bank, and Ashton, Raggatt, McDougall; and 
(3) Rothschild & Sons with Multiplex, and Denton Corker Marshall 
(Finlay, 2001). The bidding costs were around $2-3 million without 
any guarantee of success (Fitzgerald, 2004).
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The State Rail Authority of Victoria was set up to operate the 
station’s rail function on the Government’s behalf. Civic Nexus Pty 
Limited (the concessionaire or consortium), led by ABN AMRO, 
won the bid in July, 2002. The major stakeholders involved in the 
project are illustrated in Figure 1. The winning proposal included 
a 42,000 square metre wave-like roof, a 30 bay bus station, and 
airport-style baggage and concourse facilities. In the original 
vision, Civic Nexus proposed that the adjoining land should form 
a ‘massive new mixed-use precinct that will incorporate a 50,000 
square metre commercial offi ce tower, two residential apartment 
towers with about 500 apartments and up to 15,000 square metres 
of retail space, including a supermarket and other specialty stores’ 
(Lindsay, 2003).
In PPP projects, government might choose to transfer most or 
even all of the risks to the private partner. The transfer however 
does not come without costs in that private partners are experts 
at fully factoring the risk premium into the PPP deals. According 
to the Government, the Project has a net present value (NPV) of 
AU$300 million and gives a real rate of return at 9.7% or a nominal 
rate of return at 12.2% allowing for an infl ation rate of 2.5% per 
annum. However, it is suggested that the risk-adjusted discount 
rate used by the Government to assess the NPV of cost, e.g. the 
annual fee the government would pay, was too high (Fitzgerald, 
2004), and should be the rate at which government pay interest if 
it fi nanced the project by itself (Davidson, 2006). Using a discount 
rate of 5.8% which is the interest rate when the government 
borrows capital, the NPV of the Project is AU$422 million. 
Therefore, that is to say the Government had decided to pay a risk 
premium of AU$122 million, which is more than one sixth of the 
project value, for transferring all the risks relating to the Project to 
the private partner (AAR, 2002b; Davidson, 2006). Whether VFM 
has been maximised is questionable.
By the time of data collection, the Project was very close to the 
end of the construction phase. It was thus possible to investigate 
the allocation strategies for all risks (except for those in the 
operation and maintenance stages) and their impact on project 
performance. However, it may be more meaningful to focus on 
those risks, the allocation of which made greater impact, both 
positive and negative. Therefore, only two risks, i.e. the fi nancial 
and construction risks, are discussed in the following sections.
FINANCIAL RISK
In August, 2002, the Government fi nalised the agreement with 
Civic Nexus. The station was then valued at $350 million and Civic 
Nexus would also build associated developments worth another 
$350 million, including a shopping mall and three offi ce-residential 
towers (Packham, 2002). The Government would pay Civic 
Nexus $34 million per annum for 30 years. In return, Civic Nexus 
would be responsible for maintaining the facility. Afterwards, the 
ownership of the Station would be transferred to the Government 
(Davidson, 2002). This payment stream was equivalent to an NPV 
of AU$309 million at a nominal pre-tax discounting rate of 8.65% 
and involved a saving against the risk-adjusted cost of the PSC 
at 5% (Fitzgerald, 2004). In addition, Civic Nexus would pay the 
Government $66 million for commercial development rights via 
a 99-year lease for properties adjacent to the Station (Lindsay, 
2003).
In order to fi nance the construction, Civic Nexus issued three 
tranches of bonds. The fi rst two tranches were a AU$135 million 
indexed bond with a 30-year maturity, and a AU$200 million fi xed-
rate bond with a 12-year maturity due on September 15, 2014 
(Lindsay, 2003). Due to the existence of a series of mechanisms to 
cover risks, both bonds attracted investors with the former issued 
at 50 basis points above the Commonwealth indexed bond of 2015 
and the latter at 67 basis points above the swap rate (Anonymous, 
2002). In April, 2003, Civic Nexus issued the third tranche of 
bonds, a US$73.9 million one maturing in September, 2014, which 
specifi cally targeted US investors. ABN AMRO was the underwriter 
and provided a 12-year cross currency swap to mitigate the 
currency risk (Lindsay, 2003). In addition, Leighton Contractors 
provided AU$60 million in case there were construction overruns or 
failure, which in fact is a license fee that Leighton Contractors paid 
to the State Rail Authority of Victoria.
In December, 2003, ABN AMRO announced that it had formed a 
Social Infrastructure Strategic Alliance with Development Australia 
Fund Management Ltd. (DAF) to acquire and manage Social 
Figure 1: Major stakeholders in the Southern Cross Station redevelopment project
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Infrastructure investments for superannuation funds. Whilst ABN 
AMRO retained a 25% interest in the project until sometime after 
the commissioning, DAF gained a 75% equity stake in the station 
for an undisclosed amount (ABN AMRO, 2003). The fi nancial 
structure is demonstrated below in the fl owchart (see Figure 2).
Financial risk refers to the risk that the fi nanciers will not provide or 
continue to provide funding to the project, that fi nancial parameters 
will change, and that the fi nancial structure is not suffi ciently 
robust to provide fair returns to debt and equity over the life of the 
project (DTF, 2001). However, the odds at which fi nancial risk may 
materialise are greatest in the early stage of a PPP project. By that 
time, huge capital investments of limited alternative usage have 
not been made yet (Winch, 1989). Therefore, asset specifi city was 
not as high as that in later stages. As discussed above, transaction 
frequency is typically low in construction (Winch, 2002). Besides, 
the partners in the Project had never cooperated on similar 
projects before. According to TCE, risk management service 
bearing such features is better governed in the market regardless 
the condition of uncertainty factors (Williamson, 1996). That is to 
say the fi nancial risk should be transferred to the private partner 
anyway. By further examining the uncertainties in the Project, it 
was found that the legislative and regulatory framework systems 
were stable and adequate, the approval process was effi cient and 
convenient, community attitude was supportive, regional economic 
conditions were stable, and fi nancial and insurance markets were 
mature and stable. In a nutshell, major environment uncertainty 
factors were not volatile. Besides, only fi nancially reputable and 
capable parties were part of shortlisted bidding groups and the 
most reputable and capable consortium was awarded the contract. 
This also mitigated the fi nancial risk (DTF, 2001). Therefore, the 
allocation of fi nancial risk is appropriate because the practice 
generally followed TCE theory and the fi nancial risk was mitigated 
by the private consortium, the risk bearer. The analysis is 
summarised in Table 1.
CONSTRUCTION RISK
Construction risk refers to the events occurring during construction 
that prevent the facility being delivered on time and on cost (DTF, 
2001). According to Partnerships Victoria, the private consortium 
is generally required to ‘enter into a fi xed term, fi xed price 
building contract to pass the risk to a builder with the experience 
and resources to construct so as to satisfy the private party’s 
obligations under the contract’ (DTF, 2001).
The Project is notable for the architectural design of a unique roof 
to cover the railway platforms. The roof was initially conceived as 
an environmentally performing element to facilitate the extraction 
of the diesel fumes expelled from the interstate and regional 
trains without recourse to mechanical ventilation. The roof’s fl uid 
dynamics was computer modelled to prove that fumes trapped in 
upturned wells high above the platforms could escape naturally 
through holes cut into the top of each well, covered with a louvred 
cap, to aid escaping fumes and prevent downdrafts. This roof, 
which has a two-way curvature and measures a massive 4.2 
hectares, presented a major design and construction challenge 
due to the requirement that the Station would have to continue full 
operation during construction.
Nonetheless, Civic Nexus, the concessionaire, fully bore all 
risks relating to the Project, including the construction risk. 
They were ‘responsible for and not entitled to make any claim in 
connection with construction means, methods and techniques 
used to undertake the Interchange Facility works’ and had to 
‘provide everything necessary for the design, construction and 
commissioning of the Interchange Facility Works’ (AAR, 2002a). 
Civic Nexus further transferred the full construction risk to Leighton 
Contractors, the construction contractor via a fi xed term and 
fi xed price design and construction (D&C) contract. However, the 
requirement of continuing station operation and the unique design 
of the wave-like roof greatly limited the construction methods 
available. Consequently, the roof structure had to be designed as 
a prefabricated entity with structurally stable components. These 
components were cleared of tracks and associated infrastructure 
including overhead electrifi ed wires during erection when the train 
station was not running. It was impossible to prop the roof during 
its construction and hence the roof columns had to be rigid enough 
to provide lateral stability. As a result, the size of the prefabricated 
structural elements had to be maximised to minimise the required 
number of structural lifts during construction. Besides, pre-fi nishing 
Figure 2: Financial structure of the Southern Cross Station redevelopment project
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had to be maximised prior to erection to minimise the time spent in 
fi nishing the structure once it was in place. 
Leighton Contractors’ operating time was severely restricted 
by some work on the unique wave-roofed building, which could 
only be done when trains were not running. Leighton was thus 
in confl ict with train operator Connex Melbourne, who wanted to 
keep the trains running as much as possible, over the access to 
the construction site (Tomazin and Myer, 2006). By May, 2004, 
Leighton Contractors cited the confi ned working environment, site 
access issues, the demands of the franchisee train operators, 
and the complex design variations as the major causes of their 
problems. This confl ict, remaining unsolved, turned into a dispute 
and Leighton Contractors ultimately made a claim for the resultant 
losses. Interestingly, the Government agreed to compensate 
Leighton for the cost and time overruns though the construction 
risks have been transferred at the cost of the risk premium.
In the Project, construction risk was high because the design was 
highly complex and innovative, the constructability was accordingly 
  Risks in the Southern Cross Station redevelopment project  
  Financial Risk Construction Risk 
Transaction 
characteristics 
Asset specificity Physical assets specificity is 
relatively low; human assets 
specificity is medium 
Physical assets specificity is 
increasingly high;  
human assets specificity is medium 
 Transaction 
frequency 
Low because partners had never 
cooperated on similar projects 
before 
Low because partners had never 
cooperated on similar projects 
before 
 Uncertainty Relatively low because of stable 
and adequate legislative and 
regulatory system, efficient and 
convenient approval process, 
supportive community attitude, 
stable regional economy, and 
mature and stable financial and 
insurance markets, etc. 
Relatively high because of highly 
complex and innovative design, 
subsequent problematic 
constructability, construction 
contractor’s relatively scarce 
experience in similar projects, rigid 
lump sum D&C contract, and 
interrupted and ineffective 
communication among partners; and 
consequently contractor’s low 
commitment  
RA strategy  TCE-Oriented  
 
To totally transfer to the 
concessionaire 
To share between the public client 
and the developer OR between the 
developer and the construction 
contractor by, e.g. cost plus 
contracts 
 Adopted in the 
Project 
Totally transferred to the 
developer 
Totally transferred to the developer 
and subsequently to the construction 
contractor 
RMS outcome If TCE-Oriented Risk may be mitigated effectively 
and efficiently; Transaction costs 
may be reduced 
Risk may be mitigated effectively 
and efficiently; transaction costs may 
be reduced 
 Actual outcome Risk was mitigated effectively 
and efficiently; Transaction costs 
were reduced 
Risk materialized and caused 
renegotiations and claims; 
transaction costs, such as the costs 
of claims and renegotiations, were 
greatly increased 
Note: RA: risk allocation; RMS: risk management service 
Table 1: RMS transactions and TCE-orientated recommendations for the
Southern Cross Station redevelopment project
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problematic, the construction contractor’s experience in similar 
projects was relatively scarce, the lump sum D&C contract was 
rigid, and the communication among partners was not smooth 
and effective. Consequently the contractor’s commitment was low 
although they chose to accept the risk probably due to the need 
for work (Barnes, 1983). In short, major uncertainty factors that 
may trigger the construction risk were highly active or volatile and 
risk bearer’s risk management capability was not suffi cient. More 
importantly, the asset specifi city became much higher because on 
the one hand, the necessity to make huge capital investments of 
limited alternative usage rapidly leads to a small numbers situation 
where a supplier cannot withdraw due to such transaction specifi c 
investments; on the other hand, once a supplier has started work, 
typically the costs of replacing that supplier are quite high, both in 
straight fi nancial terms and perhaps more so in terms of project 
progress (Winch, 1989). Besides, a supplier may choose to hold 
up the project program and hence disrupt the production, thereby 
causing ‘temporal specifi city’ problems (Masten et al., 1991).
Such situations are common in PPP projects, where high 
performance specifi cations are involved (Masten et al., 1991). 
Under such circumstance, according to TCE, the risk management 
service would be better governed in hierarchy or hybrid forms 
rather than market (Williamson, 1996). In the Project, the 
construction risk could have been better tackled if the Government 
or the concessionaire had retained part of the risk by entering into 
a fl exible contract with Leighton Contractors, such as a cost plus 
contract. The analysis is also summarised in Table 1.
CONCLUSION
This paper presents a review of risk allocation in PPP projects and 
points out that previous research in risk management has been 
unsuccessful in understanding which kind of existing governance 
structures best suits a particular risk in terms of effi ciency and 
why. It was therefore argued in this paper that that the TCE 
theory can help incorporate the part related to economics into risk 
management research, thereby providing a logical and holistic 
understanding of the allocation of risks in PPP projects. A thesis 
was proposed that drawing on TCE, choosing a risk allocation 
strategy could actually be viewed as the process of deciding the 
proportion of risk management responsibility between internal and 
external organisations based on a series of characteristics of the 
risk management service transaction in question.
In order to illustrate the proposed TCE approach, a case study 
of the AU$700 million SCSR project in Melbourne, Australia was 
conducted and presented. The focus was on the fi nancial and 
construction risks, the appropriate allocation of which is critical 
to the success or failure of PPP projects. It was found that the 
allocation of the fi nancial risk in the case study generally followed 
the TCE approach and led to a satisfactory outcome. In contrast, 
the rationale for the allocation of the construction risk in the case 
study was found incompatible with the TCE approach and the 
adopted distribution strategy resulted in a fi nancial loss to the 
government. In pursuance to the TCE, an alternative allocation 
strategy was proposed to better manage the construction risk when 
the investment is specifi c and huge, the business environment is 
highly uncertain, and the potential risk-bearer is incompetent and 
uncommitted, which was the situation in the case study project.
The proposed TCE approach can thus be easily adapted and 
applied to the decision-making process of the allocation of other 
risks in various construction projects, especially the complex, long-
term, multi-stakeholder PPP projects. Nonetheless, the approach 
needs to be further verifi ed in a quantitative way in the future.
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